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REMEMBER THE THIRTEENTH 
Akhil Reed Amar* 
My idea in this essay is simple, but I hope significant. It can be 
summed up in three words: Remember the Thirteenth. (By which I 
mean, of course, the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.) My proposition is that however true generally the 
notion that the Constitution applies only to action of the state-the 
government-the Thirteenth Amendment is an important counter-
example, and its significance is underappreciated in a wide range of 
contexts where issues of state action and private power have been 
problematic. I will discuss three applications today: first, the 
DeShaneyi case involving child abuse; second, the racial hate speech 
and cross-burning at issue in last term's R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul ;2 
and third, the notion of minimal entitlements-what I like to call 40 
acres and a mule. 
Let me begin with the DeShaney case. DeShaney involved, 
most of you will remember, a situation of brutal child abuse perpe-
trated by Randy DeShaney, the biological father of little Joshua 
DeShaney. State social workers had knowledge of the abusive situa-
tion and did nothing; and yet the Supreme Court said there was no 
constitutional problem here because the state didn't act, and there-
fore the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Cause wasn't vio-
lated. I suggest that we should instead think about DeShaney as a 
Thirteenth Amendment case. Let me begin with a hypothetical 
from, let us say, 1868, implicating the very core of the Thirteenth 
Amendment: Former slave masters acting in violation of law round 
up--kidnap--former slaves and try to re-enslave them by brute 
force. Now, the Thirteenth Amendment clearly applies to that pri-
vate action: Slavery, the Amendment commands, shall not exist. So 
far you might think, "okay, the Thirteenth Amendment does pro-
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hibit certain kinds of private action," but I suggest the Amendment 
also and relatedly prohibits certain kinds of state inaction. There's 
a connection, as John Garvey pointed out,3 between the issue of 
state versus private and the issue of action versus inaction. If, in 
our 1868 hypothetical, the ex-slaves or persons acting on their be-
half had come to court seeking a writ of habeas corpus to order the 
release of the blacks being held in captivity, the court would have 
been obliged to act-to act on that habeas petition. The court-the 
state-could not simply have closed its eyes and ears, and sat on its 
hands. Such willful and unjustified inaction would have been a vio-
lation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and that was easy in 1868. So 
the Thirteenth Amendment clearly applies to private action-the 
kidnapping club-and to state inaction: the state or federal judge 
who, when given knowledge of the situation, looks the other way. 
Both private action of a certain sort and state inaction of a certain 
sort are prohibited, because the Thirteenth Amendment commands 
that slavery shall not exist in the United States. 
Now you might think that this has rather little to do with 
Joshua DeShaney-that there might seem to be some key distinc-
tions between Joshua DeShaney and the kidnapped slaves in my 
1868 hypothetical. I think all of the distinctions are illusory. 
Joshua DeShaney is, to be sure, a child and not an adult, but so 
were many slaves who were freed by the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, an early congressional statute implementing the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the so-called Padrone statute, was quintessentially 
about children who were brought over from Italy and put to work 
by masters (called padrones).4 The very first Thirteenth Amend-
ment case that Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase heard after the 
Amendment's ratification was a circuit case involving a 10 year old 
girl, and he had no doubt that the Thirteenth Amendment applies 
to children.s 
You might think Joshua DeShaney is different because he's 
white not black; but the core of section 1 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment clearly applies to all slaves regardless of their race. Indeed, 
many of the children who were imported from Italy under the Pa-
drone statute were white. Many antebellum southern slaves in fact 
were white by all appearances.6 
You might think that there's a fundamental difference because 
3. John H. Garvey, Private Power and the Constitution, 10 Const. Comm. 313 (1993). 
4. Act of June 23, 1874, 18 Stat. 251, ch. 464. The statute is discussed in United States 
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Randy DeShaney is the biological father of Joshua, and that slavery 
is about oppression of the Other and not about family. I would 
remind you that many slaves were the biological offspring of their 
masters. Frederick Douglass may well have been the biological son 
of his master, as he made very clear in his autobiography.7 The first 
case that Salmon P. Chase brought as an abolitionist lawyer in the 
1830s involved a woman named Matilda Lawrence who was widely 
rumored to be the biological daughter of her white master.8 These 
were paradigmatic, quintessential slaves in 1865, who were clearly 
understood to be covered by the core of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. So biology is in no way inconsistent with oppression, as Fran 
Olsen has reminded us quite powerfully.9 
You might think that slavery is irrelevant because Joshua was 
not being put to work, but many slaves were in fact the victims of 
sadism and torture rather than being put in the fields. Madame 
Lalaurie from New Orleans was an infamous sadist who simply tor-
tured her slaves for her personal amusement,ID and yet they were 
surely covered by the core of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
And you might think, well, no single one of the above-men-
tioned factors is a necessary feature of slavery but four out of five 
have to be present, or something like that. Under this view, slavery 
doesn't have to be public rather than private oppression, it does not 
have to involve an adult rather than a child, or a black rather than a 
white, or biologically unrelated persons, or work rather than simple 
sadism-but it does have to involve some of these elements. I 
would suggest that this view reflects deep error about the true es-
sence of slavery. At its core, slavery is a system of domination, deg-
radation and subordination, in which some people are allowed in 
effect to treat other persons--other human beings with God-given 
rights-as property rather than persons. It's a system of domina-
tion and subordination, and in today's world Joshua DeShaney em-
bodies that core idea of slavery about as well as could be 
imagined.II 
Now what is gained by thinking about the DeShaney case from 
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10. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution at 182 (cited in note 6) 
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406 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:403 
a Thirteenth Amendment rather than a Fourteenth Amendment 
perspective? For one thing, substantive due process is held in low 
esteem by several of the Justices, and so in order to avoid even play-
ing the substantive due process game, they try to cut off the inquiry 
at the beginning in a variety of contexts by saying "no liberty inter-
est," "no property interest," "no state," "no action," "no state ac-
tion," and so on. So there may be some strategic benefits from a 
Thirteenth Amendment reconceptualization, because the Amend-
ment has a stronger textual basis and a less tainted doctrinal pedi-
gree than substantive due process. There is also an analytic benefit 
to a Thirteenth Amendment approach-and here we see the radical 
thrust of a Thirteenth Amendment conception of the DeShaney 
case. It focuses on an aspect of the state action that even Justice 
Brennan ignores, an aspect that both Mike Seidman 12 and David 
Strauss13 see and talk about. Even before it set up a department of 
social services, the state acted quite powerfully when it gave Randy 
DeShaney custody-control over this human being, Joshua 
DeShaney. You need a license to drive a car, but they let you walk 
out of the hospital with a human being and have vast control over 
that human being. And make no mistake, it is the state acting-
making custody decisions. Custody decisions are not merely God-
given and natural-as again Fran Olsen has reminded us.14 Biology 
is not destiny. As we know from the "conservative" case of Michael 
H, 1s a biological father doesn't always have legal rights of custody 
to the offspring that he sires. Michael H. was the case where the 
biological father had an affair with a woman who was legally mar-
ried to another man; and in law the biological father was not con-
sidered someone with legal rights of custody. The Thirteenth 
Amendment reminds us that the state gave Randy custody over 
Joshua (just as it gave masters custody over antebellum slaves) and 
enforced that custody through child runaway laws (just as fugitive 
slave laws enforced slavery).16 
Now let's move to hate speech. The R.A. V. case last term in-
volved a white teenaged skinhead who burned a cross on the lawn 
12. Louis Michael Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10 Const. Comm. 381 (1993). 
13. David A. Strauss, Due Process. Government Inaction and Private Wrongs, 1989 S. 
Ct. Rev. 53, 65-66. 
14. Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 
96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983). 
15. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
16. Lest there be any misunderstanding, I am emphatically not equating "family" with 
"slavery." (This issue is discussed in depth in Amar and Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: 
A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney at 1373-78 (cited in note*).) I am merely 
identifying the presence of state action in both twentieth century family law and nineteenth 
century slavery law. 
1993] STATE ACTION SYMPOSIUM· AMAR 407 
of a black family in the dead of night in St. Paul. The Supreme 
Court had to decide the constitutionality of St. Paul's hate speech 
ordinance, and it analyzed the issue purely as a matter of First 
Amendment doctrine. I suggest that rather than just focus on this 
event as "freedom of speech," we must also ask whether it might 
make as much or more sense to see this burning cross in the dead of 
the night as a "badge of servitude" that may be lawfully prohibited 
under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. (Clearly Congress is 
empowered under section 2 but perhaps even states may act to pro-
hibit badges of servitude. Section 2 is there in order to provide enu-
merated federal power, but states don't generally need such 
enumeration in order to act.) 
It might at first seem a bit odd to think about R.A. V. as a Thir-
teenth Amendment case, but if we're talking about abuse of private 
power, the Thirteenth Amendment may help us see some interest-
ing things. It will remind us, for example, that when private eco-
nomic power is used in racially perverse ways-refusing to sell 
someone your home because of his race, refusing to hire someone 
because of her race-these things may be prohibited, and have been, 
under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment; that's what the 
Jones v. Alfred H Mayer Co.11 case was all about. In some con-
texts, the use of private power in racially oppressive ways can be 
proscribed under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, and that 
is so even when that private oppression takes the form of words, as 
in the words "for whites only" on a for sale sign, or the words 
"blacks need not apply" in the office of a personnel manager. 
So I suggest that the Court missed an opportunity to analyze 
the extent to which the Thirteenth Amendment as well as the First 
Amendment was deeply relevant to the facts of the R.A. V. case. 
The court has now granted certiorari in a case from Wisconsin in-
volving enhancement of punishment for crimes involving race 
bias,Is and I hope the Justices will now be forced to focus on the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in a way that they did not 
in R.A. V. 
Finally, and this is my concluding example, we come to the 
issue of minimal entitlements. Ed Baker has written about the rela-
tionship between capitalism and democracy, between "private" 
property and public self-government.I9 The global problem is that 
malapportionment of "private" economic power may be corrupting 
17. 392 u.s. 409 (1968). 
18. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992). 
19. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and A Democratic Press, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
2097 (1992); C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 Const. 
Comm. 425 (1993). 
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the public democratic ideal. In one context, the problem is how 
people can be full and equal citizens, able to participate in the polit-
ical process, if they own nothing (other than perhaps their own 
selves), and have no intellectual capital, no education, no housing, 
and don't even own the clothes on their backs. This was, of course, 
the plight of the newly freed slaves in 1865. The basic idea was that 
in order to make them full and free citizens in the public realm, we 
had to address the issue of private property and power by giving 
them 40 acres and a mule. This was the Freedman's Bureau vision. 
This was Thaddeus Stevens's vision-subsidized land and public 
education. 
And I suggest, once again, that the Thirteenth Amendment ap-
proach here has some advantages over other welfare rights concep-
tualizations, most prominently due process and equal protection, 
that have been proposed by others. "Due process" sounds (at least 
at first blush) more in process than substance, and seems more fo-
cused on protecting what one already has than on guaranteeing 
what one needs. "Equal protection" seems to conjure up a right to 
equal property shares, rather than a minimal grubstake. 
My three examples today~hild abuse, cross burning and min-
imal entitlements-do not begin to exhaust the possible applications 
of the Thirteenth Amendment to critical and difficult issues today 
(especially where knotty questions of private power and state action 
are involved). Spouse abuse, prostitution, pornography, labor law, 
personal service contracts, abortion and immigration are just a few 
areas where, I believe, a Thirteenth Amendment lens could usefully 
focus some of the constitutional values at stake.2o We ignore this 
great Amendment at our peril. And so I say to you once more: 
Remember the Thirteenth. 
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